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Abstract 
This study documents new evidence on the relationship between firms financial reporting behavior and engagement 
in corporate fraud. Using a matched sample of 184 companies over an eight-year period from 2003 to 2010, we 
empirically examine whether firms that practice aggressive financial reporting are more likely to be involved in 
corporate fraud. We determine aggressive financial reporting by (1) conducting a time-series test of timely loss 
recognition and (2) using asymmetric timeliness of earnings models. Our results show that firms with fraudulent 
financial statements employ aggressive financial reporting during the two years prior to the occurrence of fraud. 
Specifically, we found that firms engaged in fraud have significantly less timely loss recognition and lower 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings compared to firms not engaged in fraud. The result is robust even after including 
various controls. We conclude that aggressive reporting provides an early sign of the potential for corporate fraud, 
and thus contributes towards efforts to deter fraud.  
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of JIBES University, 
Jakarta   
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1. Introduction 
Corporate fraud has received special attention in the business community as its occurrence could affect 
it in many ways. For the businesses in which corporate fraud is revealed, the negative impact involves 
both internal and external parties. A recent survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) reported 
that the victims of economic fraud in Malaysia incurred financial losses of between US$100,000 to 
US$5,000,000 during the year. In addition to the financial losses, the companies also experienced 
significant collateral damage including damage to employee morale, brand, reputation and business 
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relationships (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Corporate fraud causes companies to lose potential 
investors and stockholders confidence. Negative exposure from the media could change the perception of 
business communities in which the company operates. Revelation of corporate fraud could also lead to 
decreases in firm value or even closure of the business. For example, a Malaysian company, Transmile 
Group Berhad, showed an 80% jump in revenue in its 2006 unaudited report. The company also reported 
a huge increase in trade receivables, from RM111 million to RM381 million; and an increase in profit 
from RM75 million to RM158 million. However, audit revealed that the financial statements were 
falsified and the company actually incurred net losses of RM370 million and RM126 million for the 
respective years. As a consequence, Transmile s stock dropped by 47% in June 2007 (Fong, 2007). 
According to Yu, Zhen and Zhang (2010), corporate fraud is a classic manifestation of the agency 
problem and of weak corporate governance. The principal-agent problem arises when the owners 
(principal) grant the authority to the managers (agents) to act on their behalf (Ross, 1973). Basically, it is 
due to divergence of interests and asymmetry of information between the managers and owners (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency problems could be eliminated if both 
parties had the same interests. However, if agents and principals are completely different parties their 
interests might not be aligned. The agents might have the incentive to maximize their own wealth at the 
expense of the principals. Moreover, the agents have the advantage of having more or better information 
than the principals do in terms of the decision situation, or the consequences of actions (Ross, 1973).  
Research into detection of corporate fraud has been a subject of interest for many researchers. Erickson 
et al. (2004) documented the association between fraudulent activities and tax payments. They found that 
firms pay taxes on inflated earnings to conceal evidence of fraud. Ettredge et al. (2008) show that pre-tax 
income, deferred tax expense and book-to-market provide incremental information in distinguishing 
between fraud and non-fraud firms. In Malaysia, Hasnan et al. (2012) investigates factors associated with 
fraudulent financial reporting practices, including the management s predisposition, motive and 
opportunity. The study found that firms with fewer related party transactions, a higher number of prior 
violations, and a greater proportion of founders on the board are more likely to be involved in fraudulent 
financial reporting than are other firms. In addition, they also revealed that firms are more likely to 
engaged in fraudulent financial reporting when non-family and non-foreigners own the company and 
when the level of financial distress is high. Their study also found that weak corporate governance and 
political connection contributes towards the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Our study aimed to examine whether firms that practice aggressive financial reporting are more likely 
to be involve in corporate fraud than those that do not. We examine a Malaysian sample of 184 
companies, comprising 92 companies that engaged in fraud and 92 matching companies that did not 
engage in fraud. Our study is closely related to Alam and Petruska (2012), which investigates the level of 
conservatism of companies that engaged in fraud identified in SEC Enforcement releases. However, we 
focus our study on the emerging market. Our decision is based on the Ernst and Young (2006) survey 
report, which claimed that fraud is more likely to occur in emerging markets as compared to developed 
markets, due to weak internal control.    
2. Hypothesis Development 
We posit that firms that practice aggressive reporting are more likely to engage in corporate fraud. 
According to Perols and Lougee (2011), firms manipulate earnings to increase the amount of reported 
earnings. The upward manipulation of earnings can be done through aggressive reporting or by 
committing fraud (Perols & Lougee, 2011). However, firms that have aggressively managed earnings in 
prior years have limited ability to inflate earnings within the boundaries allowed by accounting standards. 
The constraints lead to a higher likelihood of these companies inflating revenue by committing fraud. 
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Consequently, Alam and Petruska (2012) claim that aggressive accounting, in terms of accounting 
conservatism, could be a potential predictor of corporate fraud. This claim is based on the argument that 
fraud firms have weaker corporate governance systems in place during the period prior to a fraud being 
committed. In addition to that, Krishnan (2005) shows that Houston clients of Arthur Andersen practiced 
more aggressive financial reporting compared to Houston clients audited by other Big Six auditors. The 
lack of conservative practice in Arthur Andersen s Houston clientele is in line with aggressive reporting 
being a determinant for financial fraud.  
3. Research Design 
The study focuses on all Malaysian public listed firms from year 2003 to 2010. Following Hasnan et 
al. (2012), we define firms with corporate fraud as being firms in which corporate fraud was revealed by 
lawsuits when these firms breached the regulations of Bursa Malaysia and the (Malaysian) Securities 
Commission. In certain situations, the same fraud and lawsuit were reported more than once. In that case, 
the fraud and lawsuit disclosed in the earlier year was used to represent the firms with fraud and lawsuit 
cases. We obtained a list of companies that breached the regulations of Bursa Malaysia and the Securities 
Commission from records kept in the Accounting Research Institute, UiTM Malaysia. From the list, we 
identified an initial sample of 114 cases, but the limitation of data and repetition of cases reduced our 
observations to 92 cases only. In this study, we focus on observations from two years before the fraud 
occurred. We then identified the match (control) sample based on general industry classification system 
codes (GICS  four digit) and year of observations. 
We employed two measures for aggressive/conservative financial reporting. The first measure 
examines the time-series behavior of earnings changes, based on a model used in Basu (1997) and Ball et 
al. (2000). This measure exploits the transitory nature of economic income. Transitory gain and loss 
components measure the tendency for increases and decreases in accounting income to reverse (Basu, 
1997). The second measure examines the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In this model, conservatism 
is defined as the extent to which current period accounting earnings asymmetrically incorporate economic 
losses relative to economic gain. Accounting earnings imposes different verification standards for 
recognition of different types of economic news. For bad news (negative stock returns), lower verification 
standards are used, which results in the immediate recognition of losses. However, for good news 
(positive stock return), higher verification standards are imposed for gains to be recognized in accounting 
earnings, which results in delayed recognition of gains. 
In this study, we extend the time-series test of loss recognition and the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings model to measure the relationship between aggressive reporting and corporate fraud. We include 
the dichotomous variable CF, corporate fraud, and the interaction variable of CF with the existing 
variables in both models. This procedure enables testing of aggressive financial reporting between the 
corporate fraud sample and the control sample. The modified models are stated below:  
FNI = 0 + 1 NI + 2D NI + 3 NI x D NI1 + 4CF + 5CF x NI + 6CF x D NI  
+ 7CF x NI x D NI + CONTROLS +               (1)  
E/P = 0 + 1R + 2D + 3R x D + 4CF + 5CF x R + 6CF x D + 7CF x R x D + CONTROLS + e      (2)  
where FNI is the change in future year earnings; NI is the change in current year earnings 
standardized by total assets at the beginning of the year; D NI is a dummy variable equal to 1 if NI is 
negative, and 0 otherwise; E is the earnings per share for firm; P is the price per share at the beginning of 
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the fiscal year; R is the annual return; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if R is negative, and 0 
otherwise; and  is the error term. 
For equation (1), a negative coefficient 3 indicates conservatism, hence the coefficient for CF x NI x 
D NI would be positive if the corporate fraud sample employs aggressive financial reporting. For 
equation (2), a positive coefficient for R x D indicates conservative reporting, thus this study predicts the 
coefficient for CF x R x D would be negative in the case of aggressive financial reporting in the corporate 
fraud sample. Following prior studies, we control for firm size, risks and growth options. We also control 
for auditor size because big audit firms are more likely to influence their clients to adopt more 
conservative accounting than small audit firms when the clients' financial performance is worse than 
expected (Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2003). 
4. Findings 
Table 1 shows the corporate fraud statistics by type of violation and number of cases by year from 
2003 to 2010. Based on Table 1, most of the breaches of Bursa Malaysia and Securities Commission rules 
are related to preparation and submission of audited financial statements.  
Table 1. Corporate fraud statistics by types of violation 
Types of violation Cases 
Failing to make an immediate announcement on material facts on timely basis 26 
Failure to submit annual report/ late submission of annual/quarterly reports  23 
Failed to take into accounts the adjustments 19 
Inconsistent amount of reported profit/loss with audited amount 11 
Submit false statement to securities commission and Bursa Malaysia 4 
Market manipulation/insider trading 2 
Questionable corporate exercises 5 
Others various breaches 2 
Total 92 
Table 2 reports the regression estimates of equations (1) and (2). In Panel A, the coefficient for NI x 
D NI is negative and significant in the control samples, suggesting that the negative serial correlation in 
earnings changes is driven by a reversal of negative earnings changes. For the corporate fraud sample, the 
coefficient for NI x D NI is positive but insignificant, showing no evidence of a reversal of negative 
earnings changes. As predicted, the coefficient for CF x NI x D NI is positive and significant, implying 
a more aggressive reporting of earnings in the corporate fraud sample as compared to the control sample.  
Panel B presents the results for difference between the timeliness of earnings in recognition of good 
news and bad news for the corporate fraud sample and the control sample. The results show that the 
coefficients for R in both samples are positive and significant at the 1% level, showing that good news is 
recognized in a timely manner. The coefficient for R x D in the control sample, which measures the 
difference or the increment in the timeliness of earnings in recognizing bad news compared to good news 
is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
This result shows evidence of timely loss recognition, i.e. conservative reporting of earnings, in the 
control sample. For the corporate fraud sample, the coefficient for R x D is not significant (p>0.10), 
implying no evidence of timely loss recognition. These results show that corporate fraud tends to 
delay/defer the recognition of unfavorable economic news as a strategy to inflate reported earnings. The 
coefficient for CF x R x D is negative and significant, showing that the corporate fraud sample reports 
more aggressive reporting than the control sample.  
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Table 2. Regression estimates: aggressive financial reporting and corporate fraud 
Panel A: Time-series test of loss recognition 
Sample Corporate Fraud Sample Control Sample Pooled Sample 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.028* (7.221) 0.021* (4.112) 0.021* (4.222) 
NI -0.445* (-5.408) -0.038 (-0.227) -0.038 (-0.233) 
D NI  -0.025* (-2.834) -0.023** (-2.588) -0.023* (-2.657) 
NI x D NI 0.222 (0.783) -0.723* (-2.938) -0.723* (-3.017) 
CF  0.007 (1.128) 
CF x NI -0.407** (-2.227) 
CF x D NI -0.002 (-0.156) 
CF x NI
  
x D NI 0.945** (2.504) 
Control Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.23 0.14 0.21 
N 92 92 184 
F-stat 10.298 5.914 7.77 
Panel B: Asymmetric timeliness of earnings  
Sample Corporate Fraud Sample Control Sample Pooled Sample 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept -0.397* (-5.368) 0.463* (7.335) 0.463* (4.278) 
R 0.300* (5.068) -0.147* (-4.530) -0.147* (-2.642) 
D 0.339* (2.991) -0.306* (-4.452) -0.306** (-2.596) 
R x D -0.38 (-1.342) 0.560* (4.274) 0.560** (2.493) 
CF -0.859* (-7.020) 
CF x R 0.447* (6.195) 
CF x D 0.645* (4.386) 
CF x R x D -0.936* (-2.994) 
Control Yes Yes Yes 
Adj.R2 0.22 0.31 0.31 
N 92 92 184 
F-stat 9.744 14.654 12.771 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides new evidence on aggressive financial reporting prior to corporate fraud. This study 
documents that firms, which engaged in fraud have significantly less timely loss recognition and lower 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings compared to firms not engaged in fraud during the two years prior to 
the occurrence of fraud. The results support the arguments that managers choose to take up fraudulent 
reporting when other possible means to inflate earnings are no longer available. The findings help the 
users of financial statements in assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. 
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